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I. Introduction and executive summary 
1, Beginning in 1980, successive Chilean administrations have increased investment 
in the education sector and introduced multiple large-scale education reforms. Among the 
most important o f  these reforms are: (i) decentralization o f  public education service 
delivery to municipal governments; (ii) a shift to per-student (voucher style) funding for 
private and municipal schools; (iii) the implementation o f  performance-based bonuses for 
teachers; and (iv) the introduction o f  targeted compensatory programs for under- 
performing schools. 
2. While these reforms have led to significant gains in educational coverage, 
substantial quality and equity problems remain. For instance, preschool and higher 
education expansions have yet to reach the lowest income quintiles, and national and 
international standardized tests show a worrying pattern o f  stagnation. Striking inequities 
in the national assessment results persist between municipal schools, which serve 
students primarily from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds, and private 
schools, which tend to serve students from more advantaged backgrounds. Furthermore, a 
worrisome trend exists in terms o f  Chile’s performance on international standardized 
tests, such as PISA and TIMSS. Students in Chile have been performing well below the 
average o f  students from OECD countries, indicating that Chile i s  confronting a serious 
challenge o f  improving education quality in order to better compete in a globalizing 
world. Indeed, concerns about quality and equity were the main reasons students cited for 
the nationwide secondary school student strike that took place in May and June o f  2006. 
3. In July o f  2006, the Government announced a series o f  policy changes affecting 
the education sector, including the creation o f  a new Superintendency o f  Education. The 
creation o f  this new agency implies a reallocation o f  functions across the Ministry o f  
Education, the Superintendency, and other education institutions. In addition to new 
education quality assurance functions, the Superintendency o f  Education w i l l  l ikely 
assume some o f  the roles and responsibilities that were previously exercised by the 
Ministry o f  Education. A redefinition o f  functions for quality assurance will inevitably 
expand beyond the new Superintendency, encompassing the realm o f  the Ministry o f  
Education as well as all other institutions and individuals that participate in the provision 
o f  education. 
4. The main objective o f  this report i s  to present the Government o f  Chile with 
policy options related to the institutional distribution o f  roles and responsibilities for 
effective quality assurance in education. These policy options derive from an analysis o f  
education systems throughout the world that are comparable to Chile’s current 
institutional system but have achieved high levels o f  academic achievement among a 
majority o f  their basic education students. 
5. In order to propose options for the design o f  an institutional setup that may be 
effective in education quality assurance, the report first presents a conceptual framework 
for analyzing a country’s education quality assurance system. This framework identifies 
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individuals and institutions that participate in the production o f  education quality as well 
as key functions that an education system geared towards quality assurance needs to 
perform. 
6. The conceptual framework was then applied to Chile’s education system and a 
group o f  selected countries. To select a sample o f  education systems which could provide 
the most useful information for Chile, the following criteria were employed: (i) for the 
most part, decentralized education systems such as Chile’s; (ii) systems that explicitly 
aim for the achievement o f  high performance standards by all students; and (iii) systems 
that have demonstrated high performance in international assessments o f  student 
learning. Using these criteria, seven education systems were selected: Finland, New 
Zealand, three constituent countries o f  the United Kingdom (England, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland), and two districts o f  the United States o f  America (Boston, 
Massachusetts and Houston, Texas). Two additional systems were selected as 
comparisons that do not meet these criteria in order to have a more comprehensive 
sample o f  education systems. These additional two systems are: the Republic o f  Korea, a 
centralized education system that i s  also a high performer education system; and Spain, a 
medium-performing education system that has a more similar culture to Chile’s. 
7. In applying the conceptual framework to Chile’s current education sector 
institutions, it became clear that a number o f  important functions are not explicitly 
defined. This gap in the definition o f  roles and responsibilities o f  participants in the 
education sector may be a factor impeding the functioning o f  an effective system o f  
education quality assurance in today’s Chile. 
8. The review o f  the nine selected international education systems revealed the 
existence o f  four alternative “instructional visions” for the institutional design o f  an 
education system, which we have labeled as follows: (a) Limited State, (b) Quality 
Contracts, (c) Differentiated Instruction, and (c) Managed Instruction. One can identify 
countries that succeed in ensuring education quality in each o f  the three latter visions. In 
this sense, the decision to adopt a specific instructional vision can be based on social, 
political, cultural and historical reasons. However, once an instructional vision i s  
adopted, the study suggests that i t s  consistent application may be an important 
determinant o f  success in education quality assurance. 
9. Finally, the distribution o f  roles and responsibilities for quality assurance across 
institutions varies depending on the instructional vision that i s  adopted. In this sense, the 
policy options that the report presents for the Chilean context are based on a particular 
mix  o f  instructional visions which consider Chile’s social, political and historical reality. 
10. The remainder o f  the report i s  structured as follows. Chapter I1 presents 
background information on the evolution o f  Chile’s education system since 1980. This 
information, together with an analysis o f  the current situation o f  the education sector, 
describes the motivation for the study and demonstrates the urgent need to shift the focus 
in education policy to quality assurance. 
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1 1. Chapter I11 describes the conceptual framework developed for the analysis o f  how 
successful systems carry out education quality assurance. The framework developed 
identifies education participants, including: students; teachers; principals and school 
administrators; schools; local governments (districts, municipalities); regional 
governments (states, provinces); and the national government. In addition, the framework 
lays out eight key functions that any effective education quality assurance system should 
define: performance standards; performance assessments; performance reporting; impact 
evaluation o f  policies and programs; requirements to operate; ensuring adequate and 
equitable resources; autonomy, intervention, and support; and accountability and 
consequences. In Chapter 111, this framework i s  employed to analyze Chile’s current 
education quality assurance system. 
12. Chapter IV  applies the framework to the nine education systems selected as 
comparisons and presents a summary o f  the quality assurance functions and institutions 
in each selected education system. 
13. Chapter V describes the four alternative instructional visions for quality assurance 
in education developed as a result o f  the international review. Each instructional vision 
implies a different degree o f  school autonomy relative to government control. At the 
same time, different visions accommodate varying numbers o f  instructional models. 
14. Finally, Chapter V I  presents policy options for the distribution o f  roles and 
responsibilities for education quality assurance across individuals and/or institutions, 
which vary depending on the instructional vision followed. These options take into 
account Chile’s social, political and historical reality. 
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11. Background on Chile’s Education System 
15. The decentralization process initiated in Chile in the early 1980s transferred the 
administration o f  public schools to the municipal governments. The reform also opened 
the way for private sector participation as a provider o f  publicly financed education by 
establishing a voucher-type student-based subsidy. Three types o f  schools were 
established: municipal schools, financed b y  the student-based subsidy granted by the 
State and run by municipalities; private subsidized schools, financed by the State student- 
based subsidy and run by  the private sector; and private fee-paying schools, financed by 
fees paid by  parents and run by the private sector. 
16. While education provision was decentralized to municipalities and private 
schools, a number o f  important policy decisions remained within the purview o f  the 
national Ministry o f  Education. These include, among others: determining public 
(municipal) school teachers’ remuneration system and negotiating their contracts; setting 
operational requirements for schools, teachers, and administrative staffs; setting curricula 
and student assessment systems; and determining the size o f  the per-student subsidy. In 
addition to the Ministry o f  Education, the Consejo Superior de Educacidn (Superior 
Education Council) i s  charged with approving curricula and standards developed by the 
Ministry. 
17. The institutional arrangements for education policy and provision in Chile are 
summarized in Figure 1. The Ministry o f  Education, whose maximum authorities (the 
Minister and Under-Secretary) are appointed b y  the President o f  Chile, has offices at the 
regional and provincial levels. At the regional level, these offices are the Regional 
Ministerial Secretariats (Secretarias Regionales Ministeriales, or SEREMIs), whose 
maximum authority (the Regional Ministerial Secretary o f  Education) i s  also appointed 
directly b y  the President o f  Chile. At the provincial level, the central Ministry has a 
Departmental office (Departamentos Provinciales, or DEPROVs) which i s  responsible o f  
monitoring school service delivery. Public school administration i s  in the hands o f  the 
municipal government, whose maximum authority i s  the Mayor, an elected public 
official. Private schools are run by either individual entrepreneurs or corporations. 
Figure 1: Institutional Arrangements in Chile’s Education System 
Education Policy Setting, Monitoring, Evaluation: 
Ministry of Education (Mineduc, Central Office) 
Regional Ministerial Secretariats of Education 
Provincial Departments of Education 
School administration: 
Municipal governments 
Private corporations 
Education provisiodservice delivery: 
Private schools 
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18. To date, the size o f  the per-student subsidy has been the same for both municipal 
and subsidized private schools. In addition, the size o f  the per-student subsidy has also 
been disassociated from student socioeconomic background, although Congress i s  
currently reviewing a proposal to introduce a preferential subsidy which would provide 
more resources to students from disadvantaged households. 
19. Fee-paying private schools are generally for profit, whereas subsidized private 
schools can be non-profit or for profit. Non-profit private schools include church schools 
and those dependent on foundations or private corporations, some o f  which are linked to 
sectors o f  industry. For-profit schools mostly operate l ike f i rms,  generating returns for 
their owners. 
20. There are two additional important differences between municipal and private 
schools: (i) student selection and (ii) teacher hiring and compensation. While subsidized 
private schools can (and regularly do) select their students, municipal schools are 
required to admit all students interested in enrolling. Regarding teacher contracts, private 
schools have the authority to directly hire and dismiss teachers and determine their 
compensation as long as they abide by the Labor Code. In contrast, municipal schools 
are required to pay teachers according to a national salary scale that i s  negotiated by  the 
central Ministry o f  Education wi th the national teachers unions and their contracts are 
determined by  the Teacher Statute, a more rigid regulation than i s  the Labor Code. 
Because municipal school teachers are governed by the Teacher Statute, their dismissal i s  
also much more difficult than that o f  teachers in private schools. 
21. Since the return o f  democracy in 1990, successive governments have increased 
education investment significantly (see Figure 2), which has resulted in a substantial 
expansion in the quantity and quality o f  educational inputs as well  as a substantial 
expansion o f  the time students spend in schools (Full-Time School reform). At the same 
time, compensatory programs were introduced aimed at increasing school coverage while 
expanding school infrastructure and facilities, especially for the most vulnerable students. 
5 
Figure 2: Evolution of Education Investment in Chile, 1990-2004’ 
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22. The r ise in education investment has translated into significant gains in terms o f  
educational coverage in primary and secondary education (see Figure 3). In spite o f  the 
increase in enrollments in primary and secondary, enrollment growth in preschool and 
higher education has been more limited and coverage i s  well below universal. 
Additionally, substantial gaps by  income in access to preschool and higher education 
expansions persist (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
Figure 3: Enrollment in Primary and Secondary Education, 1990-2004 (percent)2 
105 
100 
95 
90 
85 
80 
75 
50 4 1 
1 - - -+ - - Net: Primary --e- Gross: Primary - - -+ - - Net: Secondary ----c--- Gross: Secondary I 
Source: Public education expenditure: Financial Resources Department, Budget and  Planning Division 
(MINEDUC); private education expenditure: Nat ional  Accounts Department’s (MINEDUC) calculations 
based on data from Central Bank  o f  Chile; GDP: Central B a n k  o f  Chile. T h e  2003 f igure i s  provisional and the 
2004 figure preliminary. 
* Source: Development  and  Studies Depar tment  (MINEDUC); Na t iona l  Inst i tute o f  Statistics CINE) ‘‘Chile 
hacia e l  2050 - Proyecciones de Poblaci6n 1990-2050”, August 2005. 
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Figure 5: Higher Education Enrollment Rate, by Income Quintile (per~ent)~ 
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23. While the introduction o f  the per-student subsidy largely contributed to the 
expansion in enrollment in primary and secondary schools, the quality o f  services 
provided by these schools i s  an issue o f  concern. National standardized achievement tests 
show l i t t le improvement over time, even in primary education where enrollment has been 
near universal since the early 1970s, and the performance o f  Chilean students in 
international tests i s  well below that o f  students in OECD countries. For example, while 
32 percent o f  15-year old students in OECD countries have reading achievement levels in 
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) that are in the top two 
levels, only 6 percent o f  students in Chile do so. Perhaps even more troubling i s  that 
while 20 percent o f  Chilean 15-year olds perform below the first level indicating that they 
cannot master basic reading skil ls, in OECD countries this figure i s  6 percent (Figure 6). 
3 Sotrrce: MIDEPLAN, CASEN Surveys 1990 and 2003. 
4 Solrrce: MIDEPLAN, CASEN Surveys 1990 and 2003. 
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Figure 6: Percentage of Students in the Different Levels of Performance in PISA 
2000 reading, by Country’ 
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24. The voucher system together with private provision o f  education was expected to 
promote competition between schools by  attracting and retaining students, creating an 
“education market” that through competition would encourage efficiency and educational 
quality. 
25. The extent to which school choice can raise education quality i s  a hotly debated 
issue among education economists worldwide. Proponents o f  privatization - or, as it i s  
most often referred to in the United States, school choice - advocate in favor o f  allowing 
non-governmental groups to provide schooling with the funding partially or totally 
provided by government. They argue that private schools are more successful in 
retaining the best o f  their new teachers and in developing the teaching sk i l l s  o f  their 
existing teachers, and as a result, they tend to generate better student outcomes. Some of 
the reasons include the private schools’ greater supervision and mentoring o f  new 
teachers, their ability to demand teachers with higher quality education, to attract teachers 
who exert more effort and independence, and, ultimately, their freedom to dismiss 
teachers for poor performance (Ballou and Podgursky 1998, Hoxby 2000). Opponents to 
school choice put forth that, because private schools can select students while public 
schools cannot, privatization leads to increased sorting by  racial/ethnic, socio-economic, 
and cultural background, leaving the public sector with the difficult task o f  serving the 
most disadvantaged children while having less resources than in a fully public (both in 
terms o f  finance and provision) education system (see, for example, Fuller and Elmore 
1996). 
26. The question o f  whether competition among schools can lead to improvements in 
education quality in Chile i s  beyond the scope o f  this study. Previous research on the 
5 Source: OECD. 
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relative effectiveness o f  private and public schools in Chile has yielded varying results. 
Rodriguez (1988), Aedo and Larraiiaga (1994), Aedo (1997), find that private voucher 
schools achieve higher levels o f  student outcomes than do municipal schools. In contrast, 
Mizala and Romaguera (2001) and, in a series o f  papers, McEwan and Carnoy (1999 and 
2000) have found that private voucher schools do not perform any differently from 
municipal schools. However, when distinguishing between non-religious and Catholic 
voucher schools, McEwan and Carnoy (2000) do find that Catholic voucher schools 
outperform municipal schools. The main differences among the studies include the 
samples used, the variables included in the analyses, and how the different sectors are 
categorized in the analyses. Given the confounding effects o f  student background, peer 
effects and other unobservable variables, empirically identifying the impact o f  
competition on student outcomes i s  methodologically challenging. Thus, research 
findings remain inconsistent regarding the extent to which competition between private 
and public schools improves student outcomes and/or raises inequality across different 
groups o f  students. 
27. However, i t  i s  useful to analyze the details o f  the education market system in 
Chile to better understand how it may contribute to increase student learning outcomes. 
Indeed, Chile has made important reforms in the direction o f  providing school choice to 
families, and by  now these reforms are widely accepted by the majority o f  Chileans. A 
concrete achievement o f  the reform has been to increase coverage and retention. Going 
back to a system where money does not follow the student, in our view, i s  unlikely to 
yield the desired improvements in education quality and equity. In contrast, 
strengthening the quality assurance functions o f  each o f  the participants in the Chilean 
education system i s  more l ikely to produce the improvements in education quality and 
equity that Chilean society i s  demanding. 
28. In what follows, we present a conceptual framework to analyze education quality 
assurance systems. We then apply this framework to the current Chilean education 
system and to selected education systems. Our analysis focuses on the best way to use 
lessons learned from other countries to build on what Chile has already achieved. 
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111. A conceptual framework for analyzing education quality 
assurance systems and i ts  application to Chile’s current 
system 
29. Many individuals and institutions work together to generate and support student 
learning, and they together carry out a set o f  essential functions to ensure education 
quality. These education participants and the functions they carry out can be synthesized 
in a conceptual framework that i s  useful in analyzing how education quality assurance 
systems operate. The functions identified as essential quality assurance in the conceptual 
framework developed for this report build on the English education performance 
management system, as described in Barber (2004). 
111.1. Conceptual framework for the analysis of education quality 
assurance systems 
30. One can identify a set o f  participants (individuals and/or institutions) that work 
together to produce student learning: students, teachers, principals and school 
administrators, schools, local governments (districts, municipalities), regional 
governments (states, provinces), and the national government. In addition, an effective 
education quality assurance system should have well-defined functions for each o f  these 
participants and have strategies to measure and hold individuals and institutions 
accountable for how much students learn. In particular, we put forth eight key functions 
that any education system that i s  geared to ensuring that al l  students learn should have 
explicitly defined for each o f  i t s  participants: (1) performance standards; (2) performance 
assessments; ( 3 )  performance reporting; (4) impact evaluation o f  policies and programs; 
(5) requirements to operate; (6) ensuring adequate and equitable resources; (7) autonomy, 
intervention, and support; and (8) accountability and consequences.6 
31. While many o f  these functions are affected by  a country’s economic, political, 
and regulatory  framework^,^ the focus o f  the report i s  on the extent to which, and how, 
each o f  these functions i s  explicitly defined for all education participants. Further, the 
functions identified in this conceptual framework are inherent to the education system, 
and the report posits that unless education participants (from students to national 
governments) have clearly assigned roles and responsibilities in each o f  these eight 
functions, i t  i s  unlikely to achieve high education quality outcomes. 
32. An important stakeholder in the educational process i s  the family. Research 
around the world has demonstrated the important role that parents and families play in the 
learning o f  their children, as well as the key role that schools play. However, from the 
T h e  f ramework for education quality assurance presented in t h i s  repo r t  was recently developed by T h e  World 
Bank  for the Government  o f  Chile. W e  are grateful to Joseph Olchefske and Amy Walter, from the Amer ican 
Institutes for Research, for a productive collaboration in t h i s  activity. 
For example, in Chile and in the Netherlands, national education laws have defined regulatory frameworks 
that grant private schools substantial f reedom to make decisions over performance standards and methods o f  
instruction. This regulatory framework can have direct effects on the extent to w h i c h  Government  can hold 
private schools accountable for performance. 
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institutional point o f  view, it i s  difficult to formally regulate the participation o f  parents 
in education. In other words, while certain things, such as performance standards and 
evaluation mechanisms, can be developed to apply to students, teachers, directors, 
schools, supporters, and government authorities working in the education sector, it i s  
much more difficult to develop such standards and mechanisms for parents and families. 
Consequently, although it i s  important to recognize the vital role that families play in 
students’ learning and in assuring the functioning and quality o f  educational institutions, 
this paper does not include recommendations aimed at families as formal participants in 
the quality assurance system. Table 1 summarizes the eight general functions and 
participants o f  an education quality assurance system according to this conceptual 
framework. Below, we define each o f  the functions in more detail. 
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33. Performance standards. For each individual or institution that participates in the 
production o f  education quality, there should be established targeted performance levels. 
For example, there should be clearly defined standards for students that lay out what they 
should know and be able to do at each grade and level o f  the education system. 
Similarly, there should be well-defined standards for what teachers at each education 
level should know and be able to do. 
34. Performance evaluation. To be able to assess the extent to which individuals and 
institutions meet the agreed-upon standards, there must be methodologies in place. These 
include standardized methods for objectively measuring what students know and are able 
to do, as well as appraising the performance o f  teachers and school leaders. In addition, 
they include frameworks for analyzing institutional performance, such as the degree to 
which schools are meeting the learning needs o f  all students who attend. Such 
assessments are used to make decisions about levels o f  autonomy, intervention and 
support granted to individuals and institutions, as well as accountability and 
consequences for varying levels o f  performance. 
35. Performance reporting. Just as important as are standards and assessments, an 
effective education system has established processes for disseminating the outcomes o f  
the performance assessments, including evaluating the frequency, scope, quality, and 
audiences o f  information on education quality at all levels. For example, in terms o f  
audiences, individual student assessment information can be made available to students 
themselves, to their parents or guardians, to their teachers, and to administrators. Teacher 
assessment information can be made available to school administrators, who can use it to 
provide differential support to teachers in order to achieve the established performance 
standards. Similarly, teacher assessment information could be made available to local 
government officials and parents. School assessment information can be made available 
to local and regional governments, and local and regional assessment information can be 
made available to national government authorities. 
36. Impact evaluation of policies and programs. An effective quality assurance 
system must have in place methodologies to regularly evaluate the impact o f  policies and 
programs and to incorporate this information into existing and new policies and 
programs. Some key questions that should be evaluated for most interventions include: (i) 
Does the program raise student learning or other student-level outcomes (e.g. retention, 
labor market outcomes)? (ii) How does it improve student outcomes (e.g. process, service 
delivery)? (iii) At what cost, comparatively speaking, does it achieve the estimated 
impact? Answering each of these questions implies a different evaluation strategy. I t  i s  
important to have mechanisms in place to design the impact evaluation o f  policies and 
programs before the policies or programs are introduced. Once a policy or program i s  
introduced, it i s  much more difficult to construct a credible evaluation strategy. 
37. Requirements to operate. An education system should have established norms for 
entry into and operation in the system for each o f  the individuals and institutions that 
operate in it. These range from age o f  entry requirements for students, to professional 
requirements for teachers, to basic conditions that all schools should meet in order to be 
allowed to operate. 
13 
38. Ensuring adequate and equitable resources. Education quality assurance 
systems should have established management, financing, and administration procedures 
to achieve the established standards. Although the capacity o f  an education system to 
ensure adequate and equitable resources i s  to a great extent determined by the larger 
macroeconomic and political context-which affects the total amount o f  resources 
devoted to the sector-education participants have scope to make policy decisions that 
affect resource allocation and distribution. These decisions range from school financing 
mechanisms-such as per-student subsidies or per-school allocations based on 
established norms-to the processes whereby resources are channeled to each o f  the 
individuals and institutions in the system. 
39. Autonomy, intervention, and support. Besides ensuring adequate resources, it i s  
important to have established instruments that assist individuals and institutions in 
meeting the performance standards. These instruments include autonomy in setting policy 
and managing resources, technical-pedagogic support to teachers and school 
administrators; as well as facilitating and coordinating with (government and private) 
support institutions and networks. 
40. Accountability and consequences. Finally, an effective education quality 
assurance system must have in place mechanisms to reward and sanction individuals and 
institutions for meeting (or not meeting) the agreed-upon requirements and performance 
standards. Most education systems in Latin America have established direct 
consequences for students who do not meet the agreed-upon standards; indeed, most 
systems have secondary school-exit examinations or national university entrance 
examinations. These examinations have direct consequences for students, who may or 
may not continue pursuing their education goals based on how their performance on such 
assessments. In contrast, few education systems in the region have established 
consequences for teachers or schools who fail to meet performance standards. 
111.2. Application of the conceptual framework to Chile’s current 
education quality assurance system 
41. To illustrate i t s  application for the analysis o f  education quality assurance 
systems, we describe the institutional design o f  Chile’s current education system under 
the lens o f  this framework. For each cell in Table 1, we address the following two 
questions: (i) Does the key function o f  quality assurance exist for this participant o f  the 
education system? and (ii) If so, which institutiodindividual i s  responsible for defining 
and/or mandating this function? When one or more functions do not exist for a given 
participant, the cell i s  left empty. Table 4 in the Appendix summarizes the application o f  
our conceptual framework to Chile’s current system o f  education quality assurance. 
42. Performance standards. Primary and secondary school students in Chile follow a 
national curriculum that i s  defined by  the Ministry o f  Education and sanctioned by  the 
National Education Council. The curriculum, in i t s  present state, only includes 
compulsory subjects and contents by grade. However, learning standards are currently 
being developed for each grade and are expected to be introduced nationwide in the next 
school year. 
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43. The standards that apply to schools as institutions in Chile are regulated by 
Ministry o f  Education’s SACGE (Education Management Quality Assurance System). 
According to this system schools have the statutory duty to fulfill a number o f  school 
management standards. Compliance with compulsory standards i s  verified via a yearly 
evaluation that i s  nationally mandated by Ministry o f  Education. In addition, schools are 
also evaluated under Ministry o f  Education’s SNED (National System for Performance 
Evaluation), a system that assesses school management practices and improvement in 
SIMCE (Education Quality Measurement System) awarding school level bonuses to the 
25 percent best performing schools. SIMCE school averages are widely reported by 
Ministry o f  Education. Although currently there i s  no breakdown in the reporting o f  
results, Ministry o f  Education plans to publish the report cards o f  those students 
benefiting from preferential subsidies. 
44. Performance evaluation. Evaluation o f  student learning against the established 
curriculum i s  compulsory on a yearly basis in 4* grade and every two years in grades 8 
and 10. The teacher evaluation system in Chile experienced a major reform in 2004-05. 
The recently approved evaluation system for teachers establishes four required 
competency levels based on teaching practice and a compulsory yearly evaluation 
mandated nationally b y  Ministry o f  Education. The performance evaluation system for 
school administrators i s  similar to that o f  teachers. Ministry o f  Education mandates 
nationwide that principals must satisfy four competency levels based on standards o f  
behavior and actions for which they are evaluated on a yearly basis. 
45. Performance reporting. There are no established mechanisms for reporting the 
outcomes o f  student performance evaluations and until very recently only school mean 
test scores were reported to parents and society in general. However, with the recent 
reforms in teacher performance evaluation, performance reporting mechanisms for 
teachers and school administrators have been introduced. 
46. Impact evaluation of education policies and programs. In Chile, there are no 
formally established mechanisms for evaluating the impact o f  education policies and 
programs. 
47. Requirements to operate. The main requirement for students to enter basic 
education i s  to comply with the statutory age, whereas remaining in the system i s  
conditional on satisfying statutory competency levels by grade set by each school. 
Competency, determined by the individual teacher, not only determines the passing o f  
grades but also affects future learning opportunities, since universities administer 
entrance examinations. Municipalities select teachers for public school posts. In order to 
be eligible for such posts, teachers must hold a teaching degree and may not have 
received more than two “below average” ratings in their regular assessments. 
Municipalities also select principals for public school posts. To access such posts, the 
only requirement that principals must conform with i s  a teaching degree. Selection, pay 
and work conditions for private school principals are determined by  each school 
individually. Finally, to be able to operate, schools must comply with space and health 
requirements and observe maximum teacherhtudent ratios. In addition, the school 
sustainer i s  required to hold a secondary school degree. 
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48. Ensuring adequate and equitable resources. A per-student subsidy i s  provided to 
finance the education o f  students in basic, compulsory grades (1-12) in municipal and 
private schools. Although in i t s  present form this subsidy i s  uniform, wi th no regard to 
individual student characteristics, Ministry o f  Education i s  in the process o f  developing a 
differential subsidy formula that takes into account the student’s background. To ensure 
that all students can access compulsory education, tuition and textbooks are free in 
publicly financed schools (i.e. municipal schools and subsidized private schools). In 
addition, about 50 percent o f  low-income students receive free meals while in school. 
49. Autonomy, intervention, and support. As a support mechanism, principals and 
provincial supervisors can provide autonomy and support to public school teachers. At 
present, most o f  the intervention that takes place i s  supervision to ensure that students are 
meeting the attendance required for schools to receive the full per-student subsidy. In the 
case o f  school principals, i t  i s  school owners and provincial supervisors that have the 
authority to support or intervene in their work. Public schools that require extra support 
can access central government compensatory programs, and, some municipalities have 
stronger capacity than others to support schools. 
50. Accountability and consequences. Public school teachers are paid on a common 
salary scale, yet evaluation results have direct consequences on pay and job stability. 
Public school principals are paid on a common salary scale and, as in the case o f  teachers, 
evaluation results have direct consequences on pay and job stability. The per-student 
subsidy i s  a type o f  accountability mechanism for schools, as receiving the subsidy i s  
conditional on student attendance. However, there are few accountability measures at the 
school level based on performance. The new differential subsidy would be accompanied 
by stronger supervision and consequences for schools based on student performance. 
51. The quality assurance structure around the last four participants o f  the education 
system (service sustainers, provincial-, regional-, and national-level authorities) i s  less 
comprehensive than those for the previous participants (students, teachers, school 
directors, and schools). At present, no statutory performance standards apply to education 
sustainers or government levels, and consequently, no mandated evaluations. At the 
national level however, Ministry o f  Education i s  currently developing compulsory 
standards o f  supervision. The only performance reporting for government occurs at the 
national level through the publishing o f  national SIMCE trends and national results in 
international assessments (PISA, T I M S S  and LLECE). Although there i s  a national 
evaluation department theoretically in charge o f  policy and program impact evaluations, 
this department i s  not very active. The finance chain that operates across the education 
sector starts at the national level, where Ministry o f  Education submits a budget proposal 
from the national budget to the Ministry o f  Finance. Regions receive operational funding 
from the national government, and in the same way, provinces receive their budgets from 
regions. I t  i s  finally the municipalities that receive the per-student subsidy to distribute 
between individual schools. 
52. Applying the conceptual framework to Chile’s current education system shows 
that there are various areas where essential quality assurance functions are not explicitly 
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defined. T h i s  evidence suggests that a need exists for the strengthening o f  quality 
assurance mechanisms in Chile’s education sector. 
53. As the Chilean case described above shows, the conceptual framework developed 
can be used to analyze, in a somewhat comprehensive way, the institutional design o f  a 
given education system with special emphasis on quality assurance mechanisms. The 
framework i s  based on the premise that proper quality assurance requires a system that 
addresses eight key functions. Namely, an education system geared towards quality 
assurance should, for each participant o f  the education system, set performance standards, 
evaluate performance against those standards, report the results o f  performance 
evaluations, establish mechanisms for policy and program impact evaluation, define 
requirements to operate in the system, ensure adequate and equitable resources for 
participation in the system, define an autonomy and control structure and put in place the 
corresponding support and intervention mechanisms and, finally, define and uphold an 
accountability and consequence framework relative to the achievement o f  standards. One 
o f  the benefits o f  the conceptual framework developed here i s  that it allows for a quick 
identification o f  specific areas needing improvement in terms o f  quality assurance. As 
evident in the description above, in the Chilean education system, many o f  the quality 
assurance functions identified need to be developed or strengthened. In the following 
chapter we synthesize the institutional structure o f  nine selected benchmark education 
systems. * 
* Chile i s  not the only country in which these functions are not explicitly defined. I f  one were to analyze 
the education quality assurance systems o f  countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, few - 
if any - countries would have explicit definitions for each of the eight key functions for all participants. 
However, since Chile i s  perhaps the lead education reformer in the region and has embarked in a different 
economic path toward development - marked by high growth rates, sound macroeconomic policies, and 
real reductions in the poverty rate - and in view o f  i t s  aspirations to join the OECD, this report focuses on 
comparing Chile to countries of the reference group o f  which Chile i s  aspiring to become a member. 
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IV. Education quality assurance systems in benchmark 
systems 
54. This section applies the conceptual framework developed to study and synthesize 
the education quality assurance institutional arrangements o f  the selected benchmark 
countries. We first describe the criteria employed to select adequate countries for 
comparison, and then we analyze each benchmark education quality system using the 
conceptual framework developed in Section 111. 
IV.1. Selection of benchmark education quality assurance systems 
55. The conceptual framework developed in this study posits that an effective 
education quality assurance system explicitly addresses each o f  the eight functions 
described in Section 111. In order to understand how these functions are distributed among 
the different participants o f  the education system, we f irst reviewed the institutional 
frameworks used in other countries with effective education quality assurance systems. 
To narrow the scope o f  our analysis, we used three criteria to select countries for 
comparison. Specifically, we selected countries that meet the following criteria: (i) 
countries with decentralized education systems; (ii) countries that explicitly aim for the 
achievement o f  high performance standards by  al l  students; and (iii) countries that have 
demonstrated high performance in international assessments o f  student learning. 
56. Based on these criteria, we first selected seven education systems: Finland, New 
Zealand, three constituent countries o f  the United Kingdom (England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland) and two districts in the United States o f  America (Boston, 
Massachusetts and Houston, Texas).’ To broaden the range o f  systems for comparing 
Chile’s experience, we also analyzed two education quality assurance systems that do not 
meet some or all o f  the criteria above. First, we selected the Republic o f  Korea, which 
has a highly centralized education system. The decision to include this country however, 
stemmed from the desire to include a high performing Asian country in our sample o f  
successful comparator countries. Finally, we chose to include Spain, which i s  not as high 
a performer in international assessments o f  student learning as the rest o f  the countries 
included in our study. However, the consultations carried out throughout the study 
suggested that it was important to include a country that was more culturally similar to 
Chile in our comparator sample. 
57. There are important differences in the income per capita level o f  Chile and o f  the 
countries selected for comparison. These differences, o f  course, affect Chile’s capacity to 
While the Netherlands has an education system that i s  similar to Chile’s with a large share o f  total 
enrollment in publicly-financed private schools, i t  does not meet the second selection criteria above, 
namely, that i t  has as an explicit goal to have high performance levels b y  all students. Indeed, currently 
there i s  political pressure in the Netherlands to reduce national attainment targets in primary education to 
provide schools with more autonomy in selecting achievement standards (Dutch Eurydice Unit, Ministry of 
Education and Culture 2006). 
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invest in education and, consequently, to have strengthen i t s  education quality assurance 
system (see Figure 7). While our selection o f  benchmark education systems focuses on  
learning from their institutional design in order to derive useful lessons for Chile, our 
analyses recognize that it w i l l  take increased investment and time to implement the 
options we suggest to strengthen education quality assurance in Chile. 
Figure 7: Per capita GDP and per-pupil spending in primary education (in constant US$ from 2000) 
in Chile and selected countries 
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58. Table 4 through Table 12 in the Appendix describe, for each o f  the selected 
countries (including Chile), the eight quality assurance functions played b y  participants in 
the education system. The remainder o f  this section presents a brief overview of  the main 
functions o f  the quality assurance institutional framework in each country. 
IV.l.l. Finland 
59. The education system in Finland i s  characterized by  the vertical allocation o f  
institutional responsibilities, though decentralization trends are evident throughout the 
system, not just at the local level but deeply ingrained at the school level. At the central 
administration level, education falls within the purview o f  two national institutions: the 
Ministry o f  Education and the Finnish National Board o f  Education (FNBE). Government 
authority at the regional level i s  exercised by the Provincial State Offices. Although these 
entities are endowed with an Education and Culture Department, education management 
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and administration i s  not primarily effected at the regional level." Local authorities are 
responsible for organizing basic education at a local level. The state grants some 
operating licenses for private schools, but almost all schools providing basic education 
are maintained by  local authorities." Private schools are publicly funded and under public 
supervision; in other words, they follow the national core curricula and the requirements 
o f  the competence-based qualifications confirmed by the FNBE. 
60. Regarding the statutory distribution o f  functions, the Ministry i s  mainly 
responsible for preparing educational policy and legislation, while the FNBE, working in 
close co-operation with the Ministry, i s  the national agency in charge o f  education 
development. The FNBE elaborates and approves national curricula and qualification 
requirements, carries out evaluations o f  learning results and offers information and 
support services. Although ministries direct the central boards in general, they do not 
intervene in their individual decisions. Thus, the FNBE i s  comparatively independent 
within i t s  own field and publicly liable for the legality o f  i t s  actions. 
61. Beyond the national level, the next substantial concentration o f  education 
authority i s  found within municipalities at the local level. Local authorities have the 
statutory duty to ensure education provision. In addition, they are also responsible for 
providing student welfare services and ensuring, through direct provision or outsourcing, 
the delivery o f  a number o f  educational services. Municipal governments share the 
responsibility o f  financing education with the central government (Ministry o f  
Education). 
62. As a result o f  decentralization, powers concerning the curriculum and i t s  
implementation have increasingly been transferred to schools. Education i s  steered in a 
more customer-oriented manner in accordance with the objectives set b y  the educational 
institutions and their maintaining bodies themselves. Consequently, educational 
institutions have become differentiated and the options they provide have multiplied, 
increasing the need for information through evaluation. In this sense, another national 
agency providing important support to the Ministry o f  Education i s  the Finnish Education 
Evaluation Council, responsible for planning, coordinating, managing and developing the 
evaluation o f  education. 
IV.1.2. New Zealand 
63. The institutional structure o f  the education system in place in New Zealand since 
the reform o f  1989 can be described as a heavily decentralized framework. Individual 
schools have considerable responsibility for their own governance and management, 
working within the framework o f  requirements, guidelines and funding set by central 
government and administered through i t s  agencies. Within this framework, the allocation 
o f  roles and responsibilities for quality assurance i s  distributed between individual 
schools and national government and agencies, with no significant participation o f  
government entities at the regional or local levels. 
lo The authority of Provincial State Offices does not extend significantly beyond the monitoring and 
evaluation of the serviceability of the school network and satisfaction of education demand. 
In 2004, private schools served roughly 3 percent of all compulsory school enrollment. 
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64. At the national level, central government responsibility for education i s  generally 
divided between the Ministry o f  Education and the Education Review Office (ERO). The 
faculties and responsibilities o f  the Ministry include setting education policy direction 
and overseeing the implementation o f  approved policies, developing curriculum 
statements, allocating funding and resources to schools, providing and purchasing 
services for schools and students, collecting and processing education statistics and 
information, and monitoring the effectiveness o f  the education system as a whole. ERO i s  
accountable to a Minister separate from that o f  the Chief Executive Officers o f  the 
Ministry o f  Education. The principal remit o f  this institution i s  to evaluate the 
performance o f  individual schools and report evaluation results publicly. 
65. Also at the national level, a number o f  agencies operate in an independent 
manner, accountable to individual governing boards and not reporting directly to any 
Minister o f  the Crown. O f  particular relevance are the Teachers Council and the New 
Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA). The former i s  responsible for registering 
teachers, removing their practicing certificates and approving teacher education programs 
that can lead to registration. All practicing teachers fal l  under the remit o f  this agency, 
including those in private schools. Meanwhile, the N Z Q A  sets and reviews standards as 
they relate to qualifications, provides awareness about qualifications quality, oversees the 
curriculum system and sets all secondary school and many tertiary examinations. l2 
66. Administrative authority for most education service provision i s  devolved away 
from central government to the educational institutions. For example, schools exercise 
discretion in the spending o f  their operational budget, teaching and area allocations. 
Schools have also earned important autonomy in terms o f  governance, as exemplified 
noticeably in the existence o f  school charters. The school charter i s  an integral part o f  
school self-management because it reflects the mission, aims, objectives, directions and 
targets o f  the board that w i l l  give effect to the National Education Guidelines and the 
board’s priorities. Although there i s  diversity in the forms o f  institutions through which 
education i s  provided, national policies and quality assurance provide continuity and 
consistency across the system. The school charter i tsel f  provides a base against which the 
school’s performance can be assessed. In this sense, private schools (serving roughly 4 
percent o f  all compulsory school enrolment) are also state regulated as their registration 
i s  dependent upon premise, equipment, staffing and curriculum standards. 
IV.1.3. U.K.: England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
67. England, Wales and Northern Ireland are three o f  the constituent nations o f  the 
United Kingdom. l3 Government responsibility for education was radically altered by the 
UK Government devolution o f  legislative powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland in 1999. The Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly gained 
legislative authority in domestic affairs, including the education field. l4 While the 
The remaining national agencies are Special Education Services (SES), Career Services, Education and 12 
Training Support Agency (ETSA) and Early Childhood Development Unit (ECDU). 
l3 Scotland i s  the fourth and final constituent nation. 
14 Due to political turbulence, the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended in October 2002 and i t s  
powers returned to the Government at Westminster. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland assumed 
responsibility for the direction of the Northern Ireland departments. 
21 
National Assembly for Wales (NAfW) acquired secondary legislation-making powers, 
the responsibility for primary legislation in Wales remained with the UK Parliament. 
These arrangements are clearly evidenced in the nature o f  education regulations in Wales, 
which are broadly similar to those in England. 
68. Education in England, Wales and Northern Ireland i s  managed and administered 
at the national and local levels, and not generally affected at the regional level. DfES in 
England, D f E  in Wales and DE in Northern Ireland are the government departments 
responsible for education at the national level, while at the local level management and 
administration o f  education i s  the responsibility o f  Local Authorities (LAs) in England 
and Wales and Education and Library Boards (ELBs) in Northern Ireland. Governing 
bodies o f  educational institutions have a high degree o f  autonomy over the management 
o f  their institutions. 
69. Central government has powers and responsibility for the total provision o f  the 
education services. The Education Departments in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
determine national education policy and legislation and plan the direction o f  the system 
as a whole. They are also responsible for strategic planning and accordingly, for financial 
and resource allocation. Education Departments receive important support from two sets 
o f  national agencies: qualifications, curriculum and assessment authorities (QAs) and 
inspection authorities (IAs). QAs (QCA in England, ACCAC in Wales and CCEA in 
Northern Ireland) are non-departmental public bodies sponsored by  and reporting to their 
respective Education Departments. Their main statutory function i s  to advise government 
on matters affecting the school curriculum, pupil assessment and publicly funded 
qualifications. IAs (Ofsted in England, Estyn in Wales and ET1 in Northern Ireland) are 
non-ministerial government departments responsible for the independent management o f  
the school regulation and inspection systems. Their duties include the inspection o f  
educational services provided by  local authorities. 
70. Local government and individual institutions implement and administer national 
and regional policies and also have their own statutory powers and responsibilities. Local 
authorities are statutorily responsible for ensuring education provision and exercise 
discretion over, among others, the school funding formula and staffing o f  schools. The 
extent o f  local authority control over the education system however, has diminished in 
recent years, as public educational institutions themselves are increasingly being granted 
more administrative and managerial autonomy. l5 Schools have delegated spending 
discretion on their budgets and hold autonomy over such aspects as the admission policy, 
teaching methodologies and the school term. A recent publication by the D E S  explained 
the new relationship between local authorities and schools as one where “good schools 
manage themselves” and local authorities “only intervene in schools” management in 
inverse proportion to those schools’ success. 
l5 Publicly-funded schools in England and Wales include: i) Community Schools, set by LAs; ii) 
Foundation Schools, owned by the school trustees or school governing body; and iii) Voluntary Controlled 
and Voluntary Aided Schools, owned by the school trustees or funding body. In Northern Ireland, publicly- 
funded schools include: i) Controlled Schools, owned by ELBs; Catholic-maintained Schools, owned by 
the Catholic Church; iii) Grant-maintained Integrated Schools, owned by school trustees of the board of ‘‘ Department for Education and Employment (DfEE). 2001. “Code of Practice on Local Education 
Authority - School Relations (DjEE Circular 0027/2001) ”. London. 
overnors; and iv) Voluntary Grammar Schools, owned by the school trustees or funding body. 
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71. Maintained schools in England and Wales, and grant-aided schools in Northern 
Ireland, refer to schools, private or public, which are publicly funded. In addition to these 
schools, private schools also operate in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Private 
schools define their own school ethos and are financed by  parent fees. Although they are 
exempt from most regulations applicable to publicly-maintained schools, private schools 
are s t i l l  subject to minimum operating requirements set by the state regarding 
healtldsafety, reporting, welfare and education quality standards. Consequently, private 
schools are also subject to external inspections. 
IV.1.4. USA.:  Massachusetts/Boston and Texas/Houston 
72. In contrast to the other countries described in this report, education in the U.S. has 
historically been the purview o f  states and local school districts, rather than the national 
government. States prescribe parameters such as the manner in which school districts are 
established and governed, age o f  compulsory student attendance, performance standards 
for students, licensing requirements for school personnel, school operating requirements, 
and provision o f  funding, through legislative statute and state board policy. District 
boards and administrations are then tasked with translating these parameters into policies 
and practices for the provision o f  education locally. The majority o f  states also authorize 
the operation o f  publicly funded charter schools, which receive freedom from state and 
district regulation in exchange for compliance with their charters, including student 
performance. 
. 
73. Given the U.S. emphasis on local control, this analysis focuses on two state- 
district pairs: MassachusettdBoston and TexasEIouston. These education systems are 
characterized b y  strong standards and assessments at the state level, combined with 
autonomy and support at the school and district level that foster an array o f  curricular and 
instructional options. In addition, Boston Public Schools (BPS) and Houston Independent 
School District (HISD) have been noted for effectively serving diverse populations that 
include a high percentage o f  low-income students, which increases these systems’ 
relevance to Chile despite the relative wealth o f  the U.S. 
74. In the past two decades, standards-based reform has become the dominant 
paradigm in U.S. education. B y  national law, each state develops standards for what 
students should know and be able to do at each grade level and subject area. States are 
then required to assess and report student performance in different grades and subjects 
annually, for students as a whole and disaggregated by race/ethnicity, language status, 
and socioeconomic status, to spotlight any inequity in educational outcomes. 
Massachusetts has been lauded” for the clarity and caliber o f  i t s  standards, termed 
Curriculum Frameworks, which encompass the arts, English, foreign languages, health, 
history and social studies, mathematics, and science and technology from Pre- 
Kindergarten (age 4) to grade 12 (age 18). Texas has been recognized18 for linking i t s  
primary and secondary education system with postsecondary education and the 
l7 “2006: The State of State Standards”, Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, August 2006 
“Closing the Expectations Gap 2006”, Achieve, Inc., February 2006 
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workplace, through academically rigorous graduation requirements, the use o f  secondary 
school assessments for postsecondary admissions and placement decisions, and a 
longitudinal data system that enables the State to track individual student outcomes from 
Pre-Kindergarten to the postsecondary level. 
75. Both of  these state-district systems provide autonomy and support to a diverse 
portfolio o f  schools, from which students and families can choose to meet their 
educational needs and interests. Massachusetts and Texas both offer charter schools, and 
students in Houston have the option of  attending either Texas or HISD charter schools, in 
addition to traditional public schools. HISD grants traditional schools authority over their 
curriculum, instructional methods, personnel, and budgets in exchange for the 
demonstrated attributes of  strong leadership, a high-functioning team, and a vision and 
plan for the school. Massachusetts mandates participatory management at the school 
level, and BPS aligns this decision-making authority with i t s  broader whole school 
improvement framework. Under BPS policy, each School Site Council must approve i t s  
school’s whole school improvement plan and discretionary budget, among other 
functions. BPS then evaluates the schools using a rubric aligned to i t s  school 
improvement framework. Furthermore, BPS provides intensive support to new and 
existing teachers and principals. Both BPS and HISD have responsibility for intervening” 
in under-performing schools and personnel. 
IV.1.5. Republic of Korea 
76. The centralized nature o f  the education system in South Korea makes it the most 
distinct from the group of  countries analyzed. The education administration consists of 
three layers o f  authority: the Ministry o f  Education and Human Resources Development 
(MOE&HRD) at the national level, the supervisors o f  education at the metropolitan and 
provincial level, and the district boards o f  education. MOE&HRD drafts, plans and 
coordinates national education policies, develops the national curriculum, publishes and 
approves school textbooks and teaching guides, provides administrative and financial 
support for schools, supports local educational agencies and operates the teacher training 
system. The Ministry delegates some budget planning processes and administrative 
decisions to municipal and provincial education authorities (MPEAs), or metropolitan 
and provincial offices o f  education (MPOEs), at the regional level. MPEAs and W O E S  
in turn delegate certain responsibilities to the local office of  education (LOE). Under this 
structure, the role o f  individual education institutions i s  primarily to implement the 
policies and regulations defined b y  the government. Schools abide by nationally 
mandated subjects, contents, textbooks, time allocation, curriculum organization and 
implementation guidelines, teaching, assessment and reporting guidelines and school 
’’ While determining and imposing consequences for performance has traditionally fallen to districts and 
more recently to charter authorizers, the U.S. government became dramatically more prescriptive in this 
area with the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, which lays out a graduated set of sanctions for schools 
failing to meet state-established performance targets. Students attending schools that fail to make Adequate 
Yearly Progress (AYP) are eligible to transfer to other schools or receive free tutoring services, for which 
districts must pay using a portion of  their national funds. Schools that persistently fail to make AYP may 
be required to replace staff, adopt a new curriculum, decrease management authority at the school level, 
and ultimately face takeover by the state or another outside entity. Systems such as BPS and HISD must 
therefore comply with the accountability requirements set forth in the U.S. law, in addition to their own 
performance requirements. 
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administration guidelines as well as provincially determined staffing and operational 
guidelines. Even private schools, which account for roughly 30 percent o f  all education 
institutions,“ are subject to the national curriculum, student enrolment and staff 
regulations. 
77. Recent trends in Korean education policy have started to move the education 
system towards a more decentralized framework. In this sense, recent curriculum reviews 
have aimed to “loosen the rigid and centralized curriculum framework” and encourage 
schools and individual teachers to become actively involved in the decision and planning 
process for the curriculum (O’Donnell, 2002). In 1995, the Presidential Commission on 
Education Reform (PCER) recommended that, to improve the quality o f  school 
education, the process o f  increasing local self-government in education should continue, 
regional distinctiveness should be respected, and the autonomy o f  individual schools 
expanded. As a result, some schools were required to set up experimental School 
Management Committees comprising parents, teachers, principals, community leaders 
and education specialists with deliberative, consultative and decision-making powers. 
However, this initiative had limited success largely as a result o f  principals’ concerns 
about the possibility o f  excessive parental interference in school internal affairs. Albeit 
small adjustments, the education system in South Korea remains highly centralized. 
IV.1.6. Spain 
78. The education system in Spain distributes quality assurance roles and 
responsibilities among the State, Autonomous Communities, municipal authorities and 
education institutions. As stated in the constitution, the State retains authority to ensure 
the unity, homogeneity and equity o f  the education system and this power i s  held by the 
Ministry o f  Education. T h i s  right translates into a series o f  areas over which the State has 
exclusive competence, which include matters relating to the length o f  compulsory 
schooling, the levels and cycles o f  the system, minimum education standards, school 
operating requirement, staffing qualifications and levels, funding and inspection. Aside 
from i t s  normative competencies, the State also holds executive responsibilities. 
Fundamental among these are the coordination and promotion o f  educational research 
and the High Inspection services that ensure compliance with legal requirements. 
Autonomous Communities assume all regulatory and executive responsibilities not 
included within the State’s exclusive area o f  competence. Autonomous administrations’ 
responsibilities include the setting up and authorization o f  establishments, personnel 
administration, expansion and development o f  education programs, student counseling, 
grants and loans. Although Town Councils do not have ‘education authority’ status, 
Autonomous Communities can delegate powers to these municipal entities. Town 
Councils are usually responsible for the provision o f  land for building public 
establishments, conservation, maintenance and renovation o f  schools, development o f  
programs for extra-curricular and complementary activities and supervision o f  
compulsory school attendance. 
2o The majority of private schools in Korea are in the pre- and post-compulsory education levels. 
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79. Educational institutions in Spain maintain a great degree o f  autonomy. Schools’ 
pedagogical, organizational and economic autonomy i s  officially asserted in the country’s 
regulations. Pedagogical autonomy i s  manifest in the schools’ right to choose 
pedagogical programs and determine an educational project, thereby setting i t s  own 
education priorities and objectives. Schools exercise organizational autonomy in their 
definition o f  annual programs and internal regulations. Annual programs establish the 
schools’ organizational and curricular plan while internal regulations address student 
rights, responsibilities and disciplinary requirements that observe State regulations. 
Finally, school economic management autonomy materializes in schools’ discretionary 
power over expense allocations, construction and material sourcing. Individual 
institutions are supervised in their administrative and managerial work at two different 
levels. The State’s High Inspection Service supervises and enforces compliance with 
basic state regulations. This inspection i s  effected, not only at the school level, but also 
within the Autonomous Community as a whole. At the same time, the Autonomous 
Community i tsel f  carries out a technical inspection o f  schools. T h i s  technical inspection 
evaluates the achievement o f  educational objectives by  looking at management, 
administration, functioning, results, legal requirement compliance and education quality. 
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V. Instructional visions for education provision and quality 
assurance 
80. The previous section reviewed a broad spectrum o f  institutional frameworks for 
quality assurance in education and revealed wide differences across the systems. This 
variability in education quality assurance systems suggests the existence o f  alternative 
instructional visions, which has direct implications for the institutional arrangements for 
education quality assurance within a system. Based on the sample o f  countries reviewed, 
this report identifies four alternative instructional visions. T h i s  section introduces these 
visions and describes their main characteristics. 
81. The experience o f  benchmark countries reviewed suggests that success in 
ensuring education quality does not depend on the application o f  a specific institutional 
framework. For example, while in Finland the institutional functions o f  policy-making 
and administrative support are separated between two autonomous institutions (The 
Ministry o f  Education i s  responsible for the former and FNBE, working under the 
auspices o f  the Ministry for the latter), the Republic o f  Korea entrusts both these duties to 
a single institution (the Ministry o f  Education). Similarly, while in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, teacher certification i s  carried out by independent professional bodies 
(General Teaching Councils), in New Zealand this function i s  fulfilled by an arm o f  the 
Ministry o f  Education (New Zealand Teacher’s Council). Although the evidence 
indicates marked differences in quality assurance functions across countries, wi th the 
exception o f  Chile and, to a lesser degree, Spain, all countries analyzed have effective 
education quality assurance systems. 
82. While they vary in how education quality functions are carried out and by  whom, 
successful comparator countries are consistent in having a regulatory framework for 
quality assurance functions that encompasses most education system participants. In 
addition, one common factor among the majority o f  countries with successful quality 
assurance systems i s  the institutional separation o f  bodies responsible for policy making 
and service provision, and for monitoring and evaluation, and oversight. In other words, 
although the institutions responsible for quality assurance functions differ across 
countries, there i s  a statutory attribution o f  quality assurance responsibilities for each 
participant o f  the education system to a specific institution. In contrast, the review o f  in 
Chile’s current education quality assurance (Table 4) indicates that in many cases the 
main quality assurance functions identified in the conceptual framework are either not 
explicitly defined and, consequently, developed, or they are weakly defined and carried 
out I 
83. The review o f  the benchmark systems suggests that each system studied has 
adopted a particular instructional vision that then guides i t s  institutional framework. 
Indeed, it appears that a country’s success in ensuring quality i s  intrinsically tied to the 
consistent and comprehensive application o f  i t s  instructional vision. Based on the review 
o f  the quality assurance systems in Section 111.2, we can distinguish four alternative 
instructional visions, which we have labeled: (i) limited state; (ii) quality contracts; (iii) 
27 
differentiated instruction; and (iv) managed instruction.21 Each o f  these visions implies a 
different institutional distribution o f  quality assurance functions. We can place these 
visions along a continuum describing the degree o f  coupling between what i s  dictated by  
the central government and what i s  implemented at the school level. Broadly speaking, as 
sequenced above, a gradual movement from a limited state vision at one end o f  the 
continuum to one o f  managed instruction at the other implies an incremental expansion o f  
central government control along with a simultaneous reduction in school autonomy. 
Figure 8: Four  Alternative Instructional visions Placed along a Continuum of 
School Autonomy-Central Government Control 
Control 
I I I 
84. I t  i s  important to note that no country implements a perfect application o f  any one 
instructional vision. Although for the most part each country’s education system 
exemplifies a particular instructional vision, each system allows for certain exceptions to 
the general model, or elements o f  other visions, to coexist within the larger structure. In 
England, for example, while the lion’s share o f  the education system follows a 
differentiated instruction vision, some schools operate under conditions that are 
distinctive o f  a quality contracts vision. Similarly, while Finland has principally opted for 
a differentiated instruction vision, the State has held a very active role in the maintenance 
o f  some special education and language schools. 
V.l. Analysis of alternative instructional visions 
85. This subsection describes each o f  the instructional visions separately, analyzing 
each vision’s main characteristics. The instructional frameworks o f  the education system 
in Chile and in benchmark countries are described in the context o f  the corresponding 
instructional vision. 
86. Limited State. The limited state instructional vision i s  based on the premise that 
market forces w i l l  act as a quality assurance instrument if the education system i s  allowed 
to function as a competitive market wi th minimal state intervention. In this system, the 
role o f  the central government i s  limited to: (i) establishing minimum operation 
requirements and reporting standards; (ii) financing schools on a per-student basis; and 
(iii) providing information to the market to facilitate informed school choice. Schools 
2’ T h e  concepts presented in t h i s  section were strongly inf luenced by the work o f  D o n a l d  R. McAdams in 
‘%at School Boards Can Do: R e f o r m  Governance for U r b a n  Schools” (2006). 
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have discretion over their choice o f  performance standards, performance assessment 
mechanisms and the model o f  instruction. Meanwhile, students have the right to decide 
which school to attend. In theory, school choice, perfect information on the quality of 
education provided by schools and free entry and exit o f  schools should ensure that only 
good schools survive while poor performing schools are driven out o f  business for lack o f  
demand. In this sense, i t  i s  market forces that define the quantity and distribution o f  
schools in the country. 
87. Among the countries analyzed, Chile i s  the only one identified as having a limited 
state instructional vision. The Chilean education system i s  based on the premise that 
parents should have the freedom to select the most adequate school for their children, and 
that schools compete for students based on their quality. The government establishes 
minimum operation and reporting requirements regarding student attendance, finances 
public and private schools based on a per-student formula, and provides the market with 
information on school quality, arguably to an insufficient extent. While publicly financed 
schools must follow a national curriculum, to date the Government does not hold schools 
accountable for meeting established performance standards or adhering to specific 
instructional models. 
88. Although Chile’s instructional vision i s  identified broadly as limited state, since 
1990, a number o f  education reforms have been implemented that in fact gradually 
introduced increased Government control in education. These reforms include: 
Mece Bhsica and Mece Media, two large-scale programs partially financed by  
The World Bank that supported infrastructure improvements in primary and 
secondary schools, respectively, as well as provided libraries, teaching 
materials, technical assistance, and support to school administration and 
teaching staffs; 
Targeted compensatory programs, including: P-900 (financial and technical 
assistance to under-performing primary schools, which reached around 1 1 
percent o f  total primary school enrollment); Rural Education (targeted over 
3,000 small rural schools by supporting teacher training and the provision o f  
curricular and other teaching materials, which reached around 5.9 percent o f  
total primary school enrollment); Montegrande (an innovation incentive that 
covered around 50 secondary schools and about 5 percent o f  total secondary 
school enrollment); and Liceo para Todos (technical and pedagogic support to 
underperforming secondary schools, which reached around 33 percent o f  total 
secondary school enrolment); 
Teacher Professional Development, including (i) initial teacher training 
reforms; a program to finance teacher internships abroad; and (iii) a teacher 
education curricular reform; 
Enlaces, an information and technology program that introduced computer 
labs in all secondary schools and 85 percent o f  primary schools in Chile, 
provided two years o f  training to teachers in IT, and developed a university 
network o f  technical support for the Enlaces program; 
Sistema de Medicidn de la Calidad de 10s Establecimientos Educacionales, or 
SZMCE, a national student learning assessment system introduced in 1988 that 
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has been regularly applied to all students in the 4*, 8*, and 10* grades every 
two years consistently.22 
89. In spite o f  these reforms, which represent a gradual shift from school autonomy to 
increased Government control, the fundamentals underpinning the limited role o f  the 
State in the education system in Chile remained unchanged throughout the past decades. 
In this sense, the system continued to be based on the notions that parental school choice 
and competition among schools should lead to high education quality. As a result, one 
can conclude that the Chilean education system i s  most closely aligned with a limited 
state instructional vision. 
90. Quality contracts. As we move along the continuum towards an instructional 
vision based on quality contracts, the distribution o f  quality assurance functions starts 
shifting towards the central government. In this second instructional vision, in addition to 
the functions executed in a limited state vision, the state i s  responsible for: i) granting and 
revoking operating licenses; ii) establishing standards for performance and performance 
assessment; and iii) implementing performance assessment in schools. The power to 
grant and revoke licenses implies that under a quality contracts vision the state can 
actively influence the quantity and distribution o f  schools. Market forces however, 
continue to play an important role in this allocation, as the decision o f  individual schools 
to apply for licenses i s  s t i l l  demand driven. Even though schools are obliged to comply 
with statutory performance standards, under a quality contracts vision individual 
establishments s t i l l  hold discretion over the instructional model and evaluation 
methodologies used to achieve such given standards. 
91. New Zealand i s  one o f  the most compelling examples around the world o f  a 
coherent application o f  a quality contracts instructional vision. Statutory performance 
standards for all schools are set by the central government. State schools however, 
serving 96 percent o f  all children, establish individual school charters with specific goals 
and targets for student outcomes. In order to be allowed to operate, al l  schools, including 
private ones, must register with the Ministry o f  Education. Registration i s  dependent on 
the outcome o f  an evaluation o f  premises, equipment, staffing, and curriculum carried out 
every three years. When a school evaluation suggests poor performance, the state exerts 
pressure for improvement by  performing discretionary reviews. Although external help 
may be provided by trustee’ s/principal’ dteacher’ s associations or purchased from 
counseling agencies, the state does not intervene directly in poor performing schools. 
Finally, the student’s right to school choice implies that market forces have a strong 
influence on the creation and distribution o f  schools around the country. 
92. Differentiated instruction. Under the differentiated instruction vision there i s  a 
significant increase in the quality assurance functions served by  the central government. 
In addition to the duties performed under a quality contracts vision, the state holds the 
following responsibilities: i) establishing standards for staff accreditation; ii) coordinating 
among schools to guarantee a balance o f  educational options; iii) intervening 
differentially in educational establishments; and iv) providing diverse services for schools 
and professional development options for staff. The autonomy o f  schools under a 
22 Source: C. Cox, ed., (2003). 
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differentiated instruction vision i s  generally limited to defining their instructional model, 
though it can also include decision-making about human resources, such as the 
recruitment and termination o f  personnel. The state has a very active role in creating 
networks o f  information sharing so as to promote successful models and programs. 
Although the central government decides on the ultimate number and distribution o f  
educational establishments, market forces continue to operate, to a lesser degree, because 
students are allowed to choose between schools. A key difference between a 
differentiated instruction vision and one based quality contracts i s  that in the former when 
a school i s  performing poorly, the state actively intervenes to improve the quality o f  
education provided rather than simply revoking i t s  operating license. 
93. A majority o f  the successful education systems analyzed here are based on a 
differentiated instruction vision. T h i s  i s  the case o f  the educational systems currently 
operating in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, Finland, Spain, MassachusettsBoston and 
Texas/Houston. In all these systems, the central government permits an array o f  
instructional models to coexist and bases i t s  intervention on school performance. Those 
schools achieving good performance are granted a high degree o f  administrative 
autonomy while those exhibiting poor performance are intervened by  the state. School 
intervention options are diverse as the central government tries to account for differences 
in existing instructional and administrative models. 
94. Managed instruction. The final instructional vision i s  one based on a system o f  
managed instruction. Under this vision, the central government takes responsibility for 
practically all quality assurance functions. Two state duties that are unique to this system 
are: i) defining a single statutory instructional model; and ii) centrally assigning students 
to school. These functions consequently affect the way in which the state serves i ts  other 
functions. Thus, school services and professional development options provided are not 
diverse, but uniformly targeted to the instructional model in place. Similarly, intervention 
in poor performing schools i s  also uniform in nature. Market forces don’t play any 
significant role in a managed instruction system and the role o f  schools i s  simply to act as 
implementing agencies for the policies centrally mandated by the state. 
95. Among the countries analyzed, the Republic of Korea opted for an educational 
system based on an instructional vision o f  managed instruction. The central government 
establishes a national curriculum, performance standards and an instructional model. To 
support this model, the government publishes and authorizes permitted textbooks and 
provides them to students free o f  charge. Continual professional development and school 
improvement services are provided to ensure adherence to the instructional model. 
Finally, students are assigned to schools in their residential area by lottery, impeding 
market forces from influencing school allocation. 
V.2. The control-model coordinates analysis 
96. Based on the descriptions presented above, we can place the four alternative 
instructional visions in a “control-model coordinates” graph (Figure 9). The number o f  
existing instructional models w i l l  determine the instructional vision’s placement along 
the “model axis.” Meanwhile, the degree of  school autonomy versus central government 
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control in any given system wi l l  determine the vision’s positioning along the “control 
axis.” 
Figure 9: Instructional visions in a “Control-Model Coordinates” Graph 
Schools 
Central Government 
97. Three instructional visions are located in the upper-right quadrant o f  the “control- 
model coordinates” graph. Visions in this quadrant permit different instructional models 
to coexist in a relatively decentralized control system. The degree o f  school 
administrative/managerial autonomy decreases and the degree o f  state control increases 
as we move from a limited state vision to one o f  quality contracts and subsequently to a 
vision o f  differentiated instruction (i.e. a movement down the “control axis”). The 
managed instruction vision i s  the only one situated in the lower-left quadrant. In this 
quadrant, a single or small number of instructional models exist in a relatively centralized 
control system. 
98. As Table 2 shows, the roles and responsibilities o f  Government vary depending 
on the instructional vision adopted. Indeed, in a system that adopts a limited state 
instructional vision, many o f  the responsibilities that governments would have to 
undertake in the other visions are instead carried out b y  the market. Similarly, while in 
the quality contracts vision, the Government develops operating requirements and 
performance standards and grants or revokes licenses to participants based on whether 
they do or do not meet these requirements and standards, in the differentiated instruction 
vision, the Government also intervenes differentially in schools to support their 
achievement o f  established standards. In the managed instruction vision, in contrast, the 
Government enforces the adherence to a unique curriculum by directly managing schools. 
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VI. Policy options to strengthen the institutional 
arrangements for education quality assurance in Chile 
99. Based on the conceptual framework developed for this report, i t s  application to 
benchmark education systems and the identification o f  instructional visions for education 
quality provision and assurance, in this section we discuss policy options to strengthen 
the institutional arrangements for education quality assurance in Chile. We first present a 
set o f  general guidelines in which our proposed institutional allocation o f  roles and 
responsibilities i s  grounded. 
100. A key underlying guideline i s  to select an instructional vision and apply i t  
consistently and comprehensively. A critical stumbling block faced by the Chilean 
education system in recent decades appears to have been a mismatch between i t s  
instructional vision, which was founded on a limited state vision, and i t s  application to 
education provision and quality assurance functions. For example, the centralized 
definition of teacher compensation and weak education quality information systems are 
not fully consistent functions in a limited state instructional vision. 
101. When selecting an instructional vision, it i s  important to realize that no single 
instructional vision i s  most effective in ensuring education quality. The international 
evidence reviewed for this report shows that countries with successful quality assurance 
systems have applied very different instructional visions. Indeed, there i s  evidence of  
successful countries in almost all the instructional visions identified here. The only 
exception to this rule i s  the limited state vision. Although we cannot discard the 
possibility that a proper application o f  a limited state instructional vision could lead to 
successful education quality assurance, we could not identify an exemplary country with 
a market instructional vision. One possible exception i s  the Netherlands, which has 
achieved impressive results in international assessments o f  student learning. However, in 
the Netherlands there i s  no explicit goal to achieve high performance levels among all 
students and, instead, from early rades students are tracked in different paths with 
varying performance expectations?’ Thus, a second general guideline i s  that Chile may 
consider moving away from the limited state instructional vision. 
102. As mentioned before, many instructional visions can potentially lead to successful 
quality assurance in education. Nonetheless, existing quality assurance mechanisms as 
well as historical, political and social factors, suggest that some models might be more 
cost- and time-effective than others in ensuring a quality education system for Chile. As 
Figure 9 shows graphically, the current limited state instructional vision places Chile’s 
education system in the top right comer o f  the “control-model” coordinates’ graph. In 
light o f  this starting point, a movement towards a managed instruction vision - in the 
opposite quadrant - would imply the most significant need for restructuring, and 
23 For a recent review o f  the Dutch education system, see Dutch Eurydice Unit, Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science (2006). 
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therefore, the most cost- and time-consuming avenue towards an effective education 
quality assurance system. 
103. Given that effective quality assurance i s  possible via more efficient avenues (Le. 
quality contracts or differentiated instruction), a more realistic option i s  for Chile to 
consider moving to a mix o f  the Quality Contracts and Differentiated Instruction visions. 
The coexistence o f  these visions within one system i s  actually not uncommon. In England 
and many districts of  the U.S., for example, special character charter schools function 
under quality contract rules within dominantly differentiated-instruction systems. 
104. The specific assignment of  individual schools to one o f  the two instructional 
visions could be based on a number o f  alternative criteria. A first option i s  to maintain 
publicly-financed schools (municipal and private-subsidized schools) under a 
differentiated instruction vision, while allowing private-paid schools to function under a 
quality contracts vision (see Figure 10). T h i s  distinction would imply that private-paid 
schools would be managed in a Quality Contracts instructional vision, in which the main 
quality assurance mechanism i s  based on the granting or revoking o f  licenses to operate. 
Meanwhile, publicly-financed schools, when underperforming, would have the 
possibility to be intervened and supported by the State prior to closure. This distinction 
however, would (and perhaps should) not exclude private-paid schools from having to 
comply with the same operatingheporting requirements as well as student learning and 
school/staff assessment standards as the rest o f  the schools in the system. 
Figure 10: Options for Chile’s instructional vision 
I I I I 
Privately Publicly 
financed financed 
schools schools 
(municipal 
or private) 
105. This first option for distributing schools between the Quality Contracts and 
Differentiated Instruction visions i s  based on the source o f  finance. A second option i s  to 
distribute schools by  dependency, assigning municipal schools to a differentiated 
instruction vision while allocating all private schools, paid and subsidized, to a quality 
contracts’ vision. A third option includes distributing schools based on their performance 
levels, irrespective o f  dependency or funding source. Under this criterion, high- 
performing schools would earn autonomy and be treated under quality contracts, while 
poor performing schools would lose autonomy and fall under the differentiated 
instruction realm. 
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106. Equity considerations may weigh against the latter two options. Assuming 
private-subsidized schools are not allowed to select students, there i s  no technical reason 
why a municipal school should access more support than a private school. Similarly, 
from an equity perspective i t  i s  difficult to justify the use o f  public resources (Le. school 
intervention and support) to support private paid schools, which regularly select students. 
In contrast, the underlying notion to support the first option - that the decision for 
allocating schools into a Quality Contracts or Differentiated Instruction vision be based 
on the source o f  finance - i s  that any additional resources should be directed to ensuring 
high levels o f  education quality for all students, independent o f  hidher school choice 
(municipal or private). I t  i s  clearly important, however, that both types o f  schools 
(municipal and private) that receive public resources be subject to the same type o f  
regulatory framework especially related to the ability to select students. 
Pol icy  and 
program design, 
implementat ion 
and in tervent ion 
VI.l. Implications for the institutional allocation of roles and 
responsibilities 
Oversight, Approvalof 
measurement and curricular 
repor t ing  frameworks 
107. As mentioned earlier, adopting an instructional vision has some important 
implications for the allocation o f  educational assurance functions across institutions. In 
this section, we first concentrate on the allocation o f  quality assurance functions across 
the three main institutions in the proposed reformed education system, namely, the 
Ministry o f  Education, the Superintendency o f  Education and the National Education 
Council. Then, we discuss options for the institutional allocation o f  roles and 
responsibilities for different administrative and managerial levels within the former two 
institutions (the National Education Council operates only at the central level). I t  i s  
important to highlight that this report focuses on quality assurance functions in the 
education sector. In this sense, the discussion that follows does not address the many 
other functions that the Ministry o f  Education carries out related to education provision, 
such as provision o f  scholarships, norms and regulations, etc. 
108. Allocation of functions across agencies. An important characteristic of 
successful education quality assurance systems involves clarity in the roles and 
responsibilities o f  each institution. In this sense, the mandate o f  the three main agencies 
could be distinguished as described in 
109. Table3. 
Table 3: Broad Mandates by Institution 
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110. The main notion behind this allocation o f  general functions i s  to separate the 
oversight, measurement and reporting responsibilities from those related to policy and 
programming as a mechanism to introduce accountability at the national agency level. 
The Council’s main role also relates to accountability. This entity embodies a warranty 
against government policy and programming conflicting with societal interests and 
thereby infuses democratic principles into the system. 
11 1. The analysis o f  benchmark education systems discussed in Section IV suggests 
that a regulatory framework that explicitly assigns quality assurance functions for all 
participants o f  the education system may be a necessary condition for effective quality 
assurance. In this sense, and in light of  the broad mandates described above, we propose 
roles and responsibilities for each institution in each o f  the eight quality assurance 
functions that integrate the conceptual framework. Appendix B provides a detailed 
description o f  the proposed function allocation. 
112. The allocation of  functions across institutions and within levels that i s  suggested 
in Appendix B remains faithful to the overarching institutional mandates proposed in 
113. Table 3. Taking, as an example, the function requirements to operate, the 
Ministry’s purview would relate to the design and implementation o f  policy and 
regulations. In this case, the Ministry would define the operating requirements for each o f  
the system’s participants and propose the appropriate legal mandates to Parliament. In the 
specific case o f  teachers, the Ministry would grant and revoke teaching licenses based on 
compliance with the established requirements (which would be verified and reported to 
the Ministry by  the Superintendency). In addition, the Ministry would be responsible for 
ensuring that existing law and regulations stay updated b y  continually revising them and 
proposing modifications. 
114. The competencies o f  the Superintendency related to the requirements to operate 
function would be consistent with i t s  mandate to ‘measure and report’ in a similar way. 
Based on the legal requirements defined by  the Ministry and sanctioned b y  Congress, the 
Superintendency would be responsible for monitoring and evaluating the compliance o f  
relevant participants. The results o f  the evaluation would be employed to make 
recommendations to the Ministry licensure and/or accreditation o f  participants (e.g. 
teachers, school principals, schools). The Superintendency would also be responsible for 
analyzing the information gathered during regular evaluations to recommend to the 
Ministry o f  Education modifications to the administrative regulations o f  schools. 
115. Function allocation by level within agencies. Having outlined the roles and 
responsibilities recommended for the three main national agencies in education, this 
section focuses on suggesting a possible distribution of quality assurance functions b y  the 
different administrative levels within each agency. Table 14 in the Appendix provides a 
detailed description o f  the recommended level distribution o f  functions within the 
Ministry o f  Education, Education Superintendency and National Education Council. This 
table also describes the roles and responsibilities o f  the education providers as this 
participant holds important quality assurance functions in the two instructional visions 
recommended. The suggested allocation o f  functions between agency levels varies b y  
instructional vision. In other words, the relationship o f  the different agencies with the 
education providers wil l not be the same in the case o f  schools falling under a quality 
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contracts instructional vision as in the case o f  schools treated according to a differentiated 
instruction vision. 
116. Although an analysis o f  institutional capacities i s  beyond the scope o f  this report, 
we recognize that the distribution of  functions put forward implies a significant increase 
in state roles and responsibilities and w i l l  thus require considerable capacity building 
across the system. To carry out these recommendations effectively, i t w i l l  be necessary 
for Chile to review the institutional recommendations in this report wi th an eye toward 
existing capacities and modify either the institutional recommendations or the existing 
institutional capacities so as to ensure efficiency. 
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VII. Conclusions and Next Steps 
117. The creation o f  a new Superintendency o f  Education in Chile implies a 
reallocation o f  functions across the Ministry o f  Education, the Superintendency, and 
other education institutions. The main objective o f  this report has been to present a 
conceptual framework for evaluating education quality assurance systems that may aid in 
the analysis and definition o f  policy options for the allocation o f  education quality 
assurance functions across education institutions in Chile. 
118. To do this, the report applied the conceptual framework to selected education 
systems throughout the world that are comparable to Chile’s current institutional system 
but have achieved high levels o f  academic achievement among a majority o f  their basic 
education students. Among the systems selected as benchmarks using these criteria are: 
Finland, New Zealand, three subsystems o f  the United Kingdom, and two districts in the 
United States. In addition, to expand the typology o f  comparison countries, the report 
also analyzed the education quality assurance systems in the Republic o f  Korea and 
Spain. 
119. The review o f  these nine different education systems revealed the existence o f  
four alternative “instructional visions” for the institutional design o f  an education system, 
which we have labeled as follows: (a) Limited State, (b) Quality Contracts, (c) 
Differentiated Instruction, and (d) Managed Instruction. An important result from the 
empirical review o f  education systems in the world i s  that one can identify successful 
countries in terms o f  education quality assurance in each o f  the three latter visions. Thus, 
the decision to adopt a specific instructional vision should be based on social, political, 
cultural and historical reasons. However, once an instructional vision i s  adopted, the 
study indicates that i t s  consistent application may be an important determinant of success 
in education quality assurance. 
120. Countries that are most successful in ensuring quality tend to institutionally 
separate policy development and implementation functions from monitoring, evaluation 
and oversight functions. However, the distribution o f  roles and responsibilities for quality 
assurance across institutions varies depending on the instructional vision that i s  adopted. 
In this sense, this report’s institutional guidelines and proposed policy options for Chile 
are based on a particular mix  o f  instructional visions which are considered the most 
appropriate for Chile given i ts  social, political and historical reality. 
121. While the report makes some detailed suggestions, a necessary first next step for 
Chile i s  to f i rs t  make a decision regarding the instructional vision that i t wishes to adopt 
to guide i t s  education quality assurance system. The Chilean education system o f  today 
falls under what we call a Limited State instructional vision. Given that, as the 
international evidence presented in this report indicates, other visions may obtain better 
results in assuring quality in education, one option for Chile i s  to consider the possibility 
o f  moving toward a combination of  two visions: quality contracts and differentiated 
instruction. These visions capitalize on what Chile has already accomplished within the 
Limited State instructional vision, in terms o f  facilitating gains in the efficient use o f  
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resources that result from the competition among schools and the per-pupil financing 
mechanism, by  creating a larger quality assurance role for the State. 
122. Once an instructional vision i s  adopted-with broad support from all important 
stakeholders-the discussion on the institutional allocation o f  roles and responsibilities 
across participants w i l l  l ikely be more constructive. T h i s  report suggests dividing the 
responsibility for education quality control between the Minister o f  Education, the 
Superintendency o f  Education, and the National Council on Education, thereby 
introducing an external system o f  checks and balances. Along these lines, we propose 
that, in general terms, the Ministry o f  Education be the agency responsible for designing, 
implementing and intervening in policies and programs. The Superintendency o f  
Education would be responsible for oversight-evaluation, measuring and publicizing 
results-and the national Council on Education would maintain i t s  current mandate o f  
approving curriculum and learning standards. 
123. The main idea behind dividing the assignment o f  general functions i s  to introduce 
accountability by  separating evaluation and oversight functions from policy and program 
development. The principal role o f  the Council w i l l  also be related to accountability. The 
Council can guarantee against possible conflicts between government programs and 
policies and social interests and, therefore, incorporate democratic principles into the 
s ys tem. 
124. This report has taken an in-depth look at the division o f  responsibility between the 
Ministry, the Superintendency and the Council, and suggests options for the eight 
essential functions that make up the study’s conceptual framework. Additionally, the 
report outlines possible divisions o f  labor amongst the various levels within a single 
agency-national, regional, and provincial-and among government institutions and 
sostenedores (an individual, private company or municipality that opens and operates a 
private subsidized school in Chile). The options for division o f  labor among institutions 
outlined in the report correspond to the application o f  a new mixed instructional vision 
for Chile, as it would mean introducing quality contracts for private unsubsidized schools 
and differentiated instruction for subsidized schools, be they public or private. 
125. Comprehensively implementing this vision o f  mixed systems in Chile, as this 
report proposes, i s  a long-term goal, since i t  requires the institutional capacity that at the 
moment does not exist, or i s  very weak. Although implementing such a system 
consistently across the entire education system wi l l  no doubt take many years, beginning 
the process with an explicitly defined instructional vision i s  an essential condition for 
fully realizing the process. In other words, without a clear idea o f  to where the Chilean 
education system should move, it i s  highly unlikely that i t  would ever get there. 
126. In order to achieve success in ensuring quality education in Chile, it w i l l  be 
necessary to strengthen the capacity o f  all o f  the educational institutions in the country, 
from the Ministry o f  Education, to the Superintendency, to school owners, all the way 
down to schools and teachers. Although an analysis o f  the institutional capacity o f  the 
various participants in Chile’s education system i s  beyond the scope o f  this paper, we can 
say with confidence that in order to implement the policy options outlined in this paper, it 
w i l l  be vital to strengthen the capacities o f  each o f  the participants for them to 
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successfully carry out their corresponding roles within an effective quality assurance 
system in Chile. 
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Appendix C: Consultation process 
Having developed a conceptual framework, synthesized the experience o f  
successful comparable countries and identified alternative instructional visions, the Bank 
team developed preliminary institutional recommendations for Chile. The team then 
traveled to Chile to undertake a broad consultative process. In Chile, the team met wi th  
key stakeholders in Chile’s education system to present the conceptual model and 
preliminary recommendations (see Table 15). The team met with each group separately 
in order to gain a broad understanding o f  the political context in which the policy options 
should be grounded. 
Table 15: Consultation Process Participating Organizations and Entities 
Senate 
Education 
Commission 
Chamberof 
Deputies 
Education 
Commission 
Ministryof 
Education 
Ministryof 
Finance 
Universidad de 
Chile 
Universidad 
Cat6lica 
(MIDE UC, 
Centro de 
Estudios) 
Universidad 
Albert0 
Hurtado 
Universidad 
Adolfo Ib i i iez  
FIDE (Catholic private schools 
organization) 
CONACEP (Private schools 
organization) 
Asociaci6n de Municipalidades 
public schools organization) 
Secondary Education Student 
Leaders 
University Student Leaders 
Teachers Union 
SOFOFA (Business sector 
organization) 
Centrode 
Estudios 
Xblicos 
Centrode 
Estudios 
para e l  
Desarrollo 
Instituto 
Libertad y 
Desarrollo 
Our analysis o f  Chile’s education, quality assurance systems and the identification 
o f  instructional visions had strong resonance among those consulted. In this sense, a 
generalized discontent wi th the quality o f  the present education system and an 
appreciation o f  the urge for immediate action were evidenced. More importantly, there 
was unanimous recognition o f  the potential for improvement embedded in ihe current 
tensions. The conceptual model presented was wel l  received and its value recognized. 
The need to increase state roles and capacities in terms o f  education quality assurance 
was consented upon. In regards to our specific recommendations, with very few 
exceptions, those consulted shared the view that a l imited state instructional vision should 
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be abandoned in favor of some mix o f  the quality contracts and differentiated instruction 
visions. Finally, no one seemed to believe that a managed instruction vision would be an 
intelligent choice for Chile. 
Disagreement began to materialize once broad conceptual recommendations 
narrowed down to practical application aspects. Among the parties consulted, various 
views were expressed regarding the preferred distribution formula for assigning schools 
among instructional visions. Broadly speaking, the 3 main stances in this regard were: i) a 
formula based on the source o f  financing assigning private-paid schools to a quality 
contracts vision and a l l  other schools to a differentiated instruction vision; ii) a sustainer- 
based formula which would allocate al l  private schools (paid and subsidized) to a quality 
contracts vision and treat municipal schools according to a differentiated instruction 
vision; and iii) a performance-based formula whereby, independent o f  finance source and 
sustainer type, a l l  good performing schools would earn autonomy and fal l  under a 
quality contracts vision while poor performing schools would loose autonomy and be 
treated according to a differentiated instruction vision. Naturally, this disagreement 
translated into differing opinions on the optimal amount and distribution of state financial 
resources among education providers. A final area in which there was l i t t le consensus i s  
in the distribution of education quality assurance functions between the different levels of 
the state apparatus (Le. national, regional, provincial and m ~ n i c i p a l ) . ~ ~  
24 Although we recognize the complexities posed by the existence of diverse political and ideological 
standpoints in education for the application of the recommendations presented here, an analysis of  political 
context implications i s  beyond the scope of t h i s  study. 
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